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A NEW LATITUDE
IN THE
CULTURE WARS
Scott Paul Gordon

onathan Swift'sA Letter of Advice to a Young Poet (1720)
notes a "modem Device of consulting Indexes," which
"is to read books Hebraically, and begin where others
usually end": by such a practice, which assumes "the best Meat" is "in
the Tails," "Authors are...us'd like Lobsters." This observation repeats
a complaint about a new "Way of using Books" Swift had made years
earlier in his Tale of a Tub (1704). Readers, he notes there, either "Serve
[books] as some Men do Lords, learn their Titles exactly, and then brag
of their Acquaintance" or they "get a thorough Insight into the Index,
by which the whole Book is governed and turned, like Fishes by the
Tail."^ Swift's language—books with indexes can be "governed" or
"turned" by readers—exposes the stmggle for control over a text's
meaning and uses: an index. Swift warns, can leave a text or an author
vulnerable. The danger indexes pose to texts, or to authorized uses of
texts, may explain why the man who assembled the first concordance

'Jonathan Swift, A Letter cfAdviceto a Young Poet, in Irish Tracts,1720-1723 and Sermons in The
Prose Works cfJonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis, 14 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939-68): 9:334j
Jonathan Swift, Tale of a Tub, to which is added The Battle cf the Books and the Mechanical
Operation of the Spirit, ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith, 2°^ ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1957), 145.
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to the Bible was sentenced to be burned at the stake: his concordance
allowed "the canonical shape of the Bible [to] be challenged."^ Swift's
disapproval registers similarly the possibility that readers who enter
books through the index ("by the Back-Door" he quips) elude an
author's own logic and instead may "use" the book in any way they
choose.
Indexes can expose, then, the often strained relations between
authors and readers, a fact madeespecially visible in the quarrel between
"ancient" and "modern" learning to which Swift contributed A Full and
True Account of the Battel Fought last Friday, Between the Ancient and the
Modem Books in St. James's Library (1704; written 1698). One book to
which Swift's Battel refers at length, Charles Boyle's Dr. Bentley's
Dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, and the Fables of./€sop, Examin'd
By the Honourable Charles Boyle Esq. (1698), contains a satiric Index
designed to extend the main text's attack on Bentley, as in this entry:
His modesty and decency in contradicting great men.
p. 238
—Plato.
—Stobaeus.
p. 27
ibid.
—Suidas.
—Fazelles.
p. 32
—Capellus.
ibid.
—Mr Selden.
ibid.
—Grotius.
—Scaliger.
—all the Modems.
p. 158.159
—Casaubon.
p. 156. 158
—Erasmus.
—Scaliger.
p. 236
—Sir W. Temp.
p. 27. 92. 199
—Mr Barnes.
p. 39.40
—Everybody.
p. 27.226.237-

^ Fr. Jean-Pierre Ruiz, quoted in Bella Hass Weinberg, "Indexes and Reli^on: Refleaions on
Research in the History of Indexes," The Indexer 21,3 (1999): 116.
' Charles Boyle, Dr. Bentley's Dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, and the Fables of ^Esop,
Examin'd By the Honourable Charles Boyle Esq. (London, 1698), U2[B], quoted (in part) in
Indexers and Indexes,34.
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By explicitly pursuing in the index the same target attacked by the main
text (another entry exposes Bentley's'^familiar acquaintance with Books
that he never saw"), Boyle tries to minimize his work's susceptibility to
readers' whims. Like the many supplementary texts (abstracts, indexes,
etc.) that Samuel Richardson appended to his novels, supplements that
"Richardson used...to foreclose rather than to open up interpretation,"*
Boyle uses his Index to prevent being "us'd" by readers.
Boyle's effort shows that indexes can be useful for authors. More
typically, as Swift's worry about the way texts with indexes can be mis"us'd" indicates, indexes are useful for readers. What Swift views as a
problem, that is, is for readers an unmitigated boon: for many readers,
only the index makes the whole text useable or, perhaps, makes the
whole useable in a different way. An index may seem a mere "supple
ment"—something secondary and subordinate, "an inessential extra,
added to something complete in itself—but the very existence of the
index positions the main text as incomplete, in need of something more
than itself.' Indexes in books are now so common that we rarely think
twice about them: it is their absence, or clumsy construction, that draws
attention. But most journals (as well as many collections of essays) lack
indexes, a fact that, for some reason, causes no scandal at all.' This lack
has meant that most readers—all readers, in effect, except those who
read a journal from cover to cover—have no way of knowing when, if
at all, the journal has discussed an item of interest, unless the item is so
central to an article that it appears in its title or among the keywords
that most databases, such as the MLA Bibliography, can search.
0STOR and ProjectMUSE have now added searchable text files of
entire runs of journals.) Put simply: without an index, much of a text's
contents are unavailable to most readers.

* Kevin Cope, review of Janine Barchas (with the editorial collaboration of Gordon D. Fulton),
The Annotations in Lady Bradshaigh's Copy of Clarissa (University of Victoria, 1998) in
16S0-18S0; Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modem Era 6 (2001): 392. Subsequent
references to I6S0-I8S0 will be parenthetical, citing volume and page.
' This definition of "supplement," based on Jacques Derrida's Of Gramtruttology, trans. Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), comes from Jonathan
Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 103.
'Peter Johnson notes that seventeenth-and eighteenth-century publishers of periodicals believed
that indexes served as "added inducementfs]to buyevery issue": "Printed Indexes to Early British
Periodicals," Thelndexer,16,3 (1989): 147.
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recognized the value of an index early on. Each volume,
since the first, has had its own index. The Index to Volume One seemed
to aspire to the quirky indexes one sometimes finds in eighteenthcentury texts, for instance one in John Gay's Trivia: Or, the Art of
Walking the Streets of London (1716) that directs readers to "Cheese not
lov'd by the Author."^ 1650-1850's first Index contains entries such as
"Cow, lowing of," which points readers to an odd example of James
Boswell's "spirited exuberance" (1:369); it also includes entries for
subjects, such as "Bees" and "Beauty" or "Self-love {amour-propre)" and
"Skepticism." Such subject entries continue in Volume Two ("Empiri
cism and empiricists," "Eccentricity") but largely disappear by Volume
Three and do not appear in the Cumulative Index to Volumes 1-10.
Nor does the Cumulative Index record references to authors or texts in
the journal's extensive Book Review section, in which critics, tasked
with assessing a work's strengths and weakness and with situating it
among related studies, often disclose most explicitly the figures or trends
in eighteenth-century studies they consider important, overvalued,
promising, or ominous. Like all representations of other things (except
the "Map of the Empire," in Jorge Luis Borges's story, "whose size was
that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it"'), this
Cumulative Index registers some features and overlooks others.
One can, nevertheless, learn much about the ten year history of
1650-1850, and about the state of eighteenth-century studies (the very
"long" eighteenth century demarcated by the dates in the title), from
this Cumulative Index. Such an enterprise—learning about an object
from (to borrow Swift's term) its "TaiT—may recall the cautionary tale
in which six blind men try unsuccessfully to understand what an
elephant is, each assuming the elephant is "like" whatever small part of
it they happen to encounter. The most familiar version of this fable is
"The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hindoo Fable" from John
Godfrey Saxe's Clever Stories of Many Nations (1865). One blind man,
who feels the elephant's tusk, exclaims: "To me 'tis mighty clear / This
wonder of an Elephant / Is very like a spear!" Another, who "felt about
the knee," concludes that it "is mighty plain" and "clear enough" that
'John Gay, Poetry artdProse,ed. Vinton A. Dearing and Charles E. Beckwith, 2 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974), 1:173.
' Jorge Luis Borges, "On Exaaitude in Science," in Collected Fictions, translated by Andrew
Hinley (New York: Penguin, 199S), 325.
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the elephant is "like a tree." The fifth blind man, who "chanced to
touch the ear," asserts that nobody can "deny the fact" that the elephant
is "very like a fan."
The Sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope.
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a rope!"
The poem satirizes the confidence with which the blind men derive
what they take to be certain and complete knowledge ("mighty clear,"
"mighty plain," "clear enough," "deny the fact who can") from limited
information. The conclusion further chastises them for their overconfidence: "Each in his own opinion," the poem concludes, was"Exceeding
stiff and strong, / Though each was partly in the right, / And all were
in the wrong!"' While, unlike the blind men, we can "see" both the
Cumulative Index and the larger object to which it is refers—and thus
can presumably test hypotheses derived from the part against the
whole—our effort to assess the ten-year history of 1650-1850 and the
current state of eighteenth-century studies by means of this Cumulative
Index may still depend on whatever particular part of it we happen to
grasp on to.
The danger, as in the case of the blind men and the elephant, lies
in drawing conclusions too quickly from the limited information that
this Index, indeed any index, can provide. The Index's easiest feattire to
note—easy because so visible—is the varied length of entries: the entry
for Samuel Johnson occupies nearly a half column while, on the same
page, the entry for Jesus Christ barely extends to a second line. Judging
by the length of an entry, the eighteenth-century authors to which
1650-1850's articles most frequently turn are: Addison, Behn, Boswell,
Burke, Coleridge, Defoe, Descartes, Dryden, Fielding, Hobbes, Hume,
Johnson, Kant, Locke, Milton, Pope, Richardson, Rousseau, Shaftes
bury, Shakespeare, Adam Smith, Swift, Voltaire, Wollstonecraft.
Although most readers of the Index probably feel some surprise that an
'John Godfrey Saxe, Clever Stories of Many Nations (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1865), 61-64.
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author who fascinates them has not captivated more of their colleagues'
interests, this list features few unexpected presences or absences.
Addison's appearance suggests that Brian McCrea's Addison and Steele
Are Dead:The English Department,Its Canon, and the Professionalization
of Literary Criticism (1990) announced Addison's demise prematurely,
while the presence of familiar triads—Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, or
Dryden, Swift, Pope—reveals that, despite a generation of critique of
foundational critical accounts such as the formal realism described in Ian
Watt's Rise of the Novel (1957) or the Augustan satirical tradition
assembled by Louis Bredvold, Louis Landa, and Irvin Ehrenpreis,
critical attention remains focused on traditional figures. (Although
perhaps on different texts; Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments
[1759] appears more often than his Wealth of Nations [1776] in
1650-1850's articles.) Despite the rapid intellectual change that has
provoked fierce and often uncivil academic wars (more on this below),
critics of all theoretical commitments continue to return to authors who
carry the cultural capital gained from having long occupied a place in
the canon of authors we study and teach. This persistence suggests a
conservative tug to even the most deliberately provocative scholarship.
The incredibly innovative theoretical work—new historical, psychoana
lytic, deconstructive—that exploded in Renaissance studies after 1980
was repeatedly practiced upon Shakespeare, as if the very headiness of
the new methods required the ballast of the most canonical author of
all. That theoretical innovation could produce enthralling readings of
Shakespeare—or of Swift, of Burney, of Blake—guaranteed, in effect, its
value.
The sheer number of references (or an entry's length), however,
tells only a partial story. Each of the numerous references that create a
lengthy entry in the Index might, for instance, refer to a single article,
and so the Index's readers should not assume that a lengthy entry
indicates widespread interest in a figure. A complementary measure of
interest might be the number of different volumes or articles in which
a figure is cited. The need to consider both these measures may be less
crucial in using the Index to assess interest in the major eighteenthcentury figures listed above: references to these authors, in nearly every
case, occur in at least 8 of the 10 published volumes of 1650-1850, and
in many cases (Addison, Burke, Dryden, Hobbes, Johnson, Locke,
Pope, Richardson) in all 10 volumes. But the entries, for instance, for
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scholars of eighteenth-century literature are more slippery. As an
example, the Index records twelve references to Maximillian Novak and
only seven toPatricia Meyer Spacks. But the references to Novak point
to only three essays (in two volumes), while those to Spacks occur in
five different volumes and in six different essays, all but one instance
involving extensive engagement with and quotation of Spacks's writing.
A list of critics to whom the Index records references in at least 5
volumes of 1630-1850 reveals a fascinating mix of older critics (Bate,
Pottle, Greene, Monk, Wasserman, Watt, Wimsatt) and newer ones
who represent a wide variety of critical practices (Doody, Weinbrot,
Paulson, Spacks, Thompson).'" This list suggests that no single critic—
and no single critical text—has dominated scholarly work in the long
eighteenth century as it has manifested itself in 1650-1850. Other fields,
I suspect, could easily point to such dominant texts: Stephen Greenblatt's Renaissance Self Fashioning (1981) and the essays collected in his
Shakespearean Negotiations (1988) were for many years the critical texts
with which scholars of Renaissance literature had to grapple. For a
while, it seemed likely that the collection of essays edited by Felicity
Nussbaum and Laura Brown, The New Eighteenth Century: Theory,
Politics, English Literature (1987), would occupy that place for scholars
of the long eighteenth century, but the articles published in the first ten
years of 1650-1850 refer to that collection, the Index reveals, only three
times (each only a quick reference).
One sounding of the long eighteenth century by means of the
Cumulative Index, then, reveals the field to be characterized by
continued investigation of canonical texts as well as of their critical
histories, old and new. Another sounding, examining the manner in
which critics treat eighteenth-century authors or use theoretical texts,
might uncover a different shape to the field. Here, too, the Cumulative
Index can provide a place to start, but only a place to start. Unlike some

Citations of the following critics appear in at least 5 different volumes of 16S0-18S0: Hans
Aarsleff (5 refs./S vols.), Paula Backscheider (14 refs./5 vols.), Walter Jackson Bate (8 refs./6
vols.), John Brewer (9 refs./5 vols.), James L. Clifford (13 refs./5 vols.), Kevin Cope (19 refs./7
vols.), Margaret Doody (11 refs./6 vols.), Donald Greene (9 refs./5 vols.), Maynard Mack (11
rek./5 vols.), Samuel Holt Monk (11 refi./5 vols.), Ronald Paulson (28 refs./7 vols.), J. G. A.
Pocock (22 refs./8 vols.), RoyPorter (16refs./7 vols.), Frederick Pottle (10refe./S vols.), Patricia
Meyer Spacks (7 refs./5 vols.), James Thompson (10 refs./5 vols.), Janet Todd (22 refs./7 vols.).
Earl Wasserman (7 refs./5 vols.), Ian Watt (9 refs./5 vols.), Howard Weinbrot (13 refs./5 vols.),
William K. Wimsatt (9 refs./5 vols.).
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eighteenth-century indexes, such as the one Shaftesbury compiled for his
Characteristicks (1711), which included entries such as these:
Beauty dangerous,
Beauty and Good the same
or
Jews, a cloudy People,
Jews, a chosen People"
this Ciunulative Index does not offer information about the content of
its references. Are its many citations of Michel Foucault, for instance,
offhand remarks or lengthy engagements? Do they make use of,
elaborate a critique of, or breezily dismiss a theorist? Do the references
to Edmund Burke read "with" or "against the grain" of his texts?
Answers to these questions would help us understand how 1630-1850
has participated in the larger world of scholarship on the long eigh
teenth century, and while the Cumulative Index cannot directly settle
these questions, it does enable us to begin to explore them.
Take, for instance, the entries for Michel Foucault or Jacques
Derrida, two theorists who, one would expect, would be considered
both "dangerous" and "Good," "cloudy" and "chosen." Foucault's entry
is the longest for any theorist in the Index, which gathers references to
him from 19 separate articles, including a parodic "life of Foucault" in
the style of Samuel Johnson's Lives of the Poets (Alan McKenzie,
"Johnson's 'Life of Foucault': a Pastirody" [10:189-204]). These articles
engage with many of Foucault's works, but tend to return to three: five
essays use The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences
(1966; trans. 1970), five essays use Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison (1975; trans. 1977), and three essays use "What is An Author?"
(1969; trans. 1977). Surprisingly, none of these references dismiss or even
dispute Foucault, despite his having come to embody a postmodernism
that often draws fire, whether justified or indiscriminate. Most critics
in 1650-1850 treat Foucault as an authority to help bolster their own

" Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3"* Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners,Opinions,
Times, ed. Philip Ayers, 2 vols. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1999), 2:35,377.
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case, quoting without critique his concepts of "episteme" or "power" or
the "repressive hypothesis"; indeed, several articles establish resem
blances between Foucault and an eighteenth-century figure, aiming to
show, for instance, "Burke's proximity to Foucault" or "Burke's delight
as a correlative of Foucault's voyeuristic pleasure" (2:114, 119). The
citations to Jacques Derrida reveal a similar story. One article engages
Derrida's claims about "logocentrism" in order, ultimately, to critique
it:
The "book of nature" has conventionally implied both antimaterialism and what Jacques Derrida called "logocen
trism"—the distrust of writing and the tendency to privilege
speech as more immediate and truthful than its visible "copy."
As I have argued at length elsewhere, however, Derrida was
wrong to indicate that hostility to writing has generally
characterized Western thought. (9:170)
But the other articles treat Derrida as an unambiguously useful ally in
the interpretation of early modern texts: "one must wonder with
Derrida" (10:165), "I agree with Derrida" (2:214n29), "Derrida's theory
of difference and signification is useful in reading West's novels" (1:140).
Following these tracks registered by the Cumulative Index, then, we can
see that recent theorists, even those once as provocative as Foucault or
Derrida, have been largely domesticated in work in eighteenth-century
studies. Critics assume a general familiarity with their key ideas and
display confidence that the appearance of their name will not provoke
a dismissal of the larger argument.
The respect accorded to theorists in every explicit reference
recorded by the Cumulative Index provides again, however, only a
partial picture. Elsewhere, 1650-1850 bears many traces of the uncivil
academic culture wars in the midst of which the journal was founded.
The Cumulative Index cannot collect all these references under any
single entry, in part because few of the protests against postmodernism
identify particular culprits, in part because many skirmishes take place
in the un-indexed Book Review section. In Volume 6 of 1650-1850
(2001) John Mahoney diagnoses the academy as "not exclusively but
certainly primarily caught up in a Culture Wars climate, in discourses
that focus on Cultural Studies, New Historicism, feminism, narratolo-
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gy, and other theoretical concerns. Such discourses...are where the
action, the genuine excitement in some cases—and ultimately the
rewards—lie" (6:335). While Mahoney's words may seem neutrally
descriptive, they register his partisanship when they imply that most
"excitement" about theory is not "genuine," and such suspicions—as
well as disapproval, even disgust—about theoretical writing occur
frequently in the articles, in the editorial prefaces, and, perhaps most
exphcitly, in the book reviews of 1650-1850. One study's
"overinterpretation[s]" led one reviewer to "yearn for the bad old days
of 'positivist* criticism, when it was not the critic's ingenuity but the
interest of the material itself that was assumed to suffice....Theoretical
ingenuity amounts to no more than an intrusion and distraction." This
last remark identifies, as well, the source of the problem: "Derrida's
name, the nom dupere, appears nowhere, though his mark is discernible
everywhere" (3:384-85). Many of the reviews that bemoan the
postmodern or poststructuralist turn may have, similarly, particular
theoretical bogeymen in mind, but typically in these reviews such
names "appear nowhere": one early reviewer aimed to comfort those
who are"withering in the intellectual desert of postmodernism, choked
by the Saussurean sands of signs that do not signify" (3:391); another
regrets, protectively, to find that "the works of Fanny Bumey are
subjected to the scrutiny of a fully post-modern sensibility" (2:323); yet
another deplores "the winds of change [that] have been sweeping
through the field of literary studies, sometimes with hurricane force"
(3:409).
These objections may lament many aspects of postmodern or
poststructuralist theory, but they share the behef that the critic's job is
to see only what is there in the text: postmodern theories impede this
task by "distracti[ng]" or even disabling the critic from an unmediated
encoimter with the text itself. They contend, that is, that postmodern
theory causes critics to see in eighteenth-century texts what is not there
or to overlook what would, had theory not blinded the critic, have been
evident: "This argument seems very satisfying to a trendy orthodoxy
that positions male voyeurism and consumerism at the heart of Western
art. There is just enough truth to dazzle us by its current relevance, but
it overlooks the dynamics of the Scheherazade story" (5:159). This
position, which we might call "Enlightenment Objectivity," surfaces
frequently in 1650-1850. An early review described one study as
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"(liffer[ing] from much recent work in eighteenth-century studies by
assuming that interpretations are right or wrong and that a careful
reading of texts and criticism can lead to the truth—that one can
adjudicate between competing assumptions and that scholarship and
criticism progress over time" (4:408). Such assumptions may differenti
ate that study from many books published in eighteenth-century studies,
but they fit well with much of the work published in 1650-1850.
Indeed, its very first volume displayed a concern that twentieth-century
theoretical lenses might "distort" the clear perception of eighteenthcentury texts, as writers reassured readers that they were not turning
eighteenth-century subjects into twentieth-century figures. "We can
recognize" that "neo-Pyrrhonian skepticism disturbed Hume," M. A.
Box notes, without "mak[ing] le bon David into a neurasthenic protodeconstructionist" (1:306), while Nicholas Hudson—describing Locke's
claim that human "classifications" never "represent the real order of
things in nature"—promises readers that this claim "is not...my
fashionable re-reading of Locke in the light of twentieth-century
relativism or deconstruction. It is consistent with how Locke was read
by both his critics and admirers in the eighteenth century" (1:249). Such
wariness about confusing twentieth-century positions with possible
eighteenth-century ones echoes, as well, through the frequent concern
that critics are "imposing current ideologies on earlier eras" (7:145),
"transpos[ing] twentieth-century ideas back to the early modern period"
(7:413), or seem "unpardonably insistent on our seeing the parallel (or
is it identity?) between" an eighteenth-century figure and "modern"
experience (2:331). One review is skeptical that "contributors seem able
to make of" Charlotte Charke "whatever they wish" (8:373); another
criticizes an author for "remaking Milton in his own post-modern...image" (7:41^. The shared language here insists on the difference
between (an improper) making and (a proper) finding: irresponsible
critics, misled by theoretical approaches, make eighteenth-century
figures into something they really aren't, while responsible critics attend
only to what they find in the text. Modeling critics on the traditional
account of detectives or scientists, these remarks insist that we can gain
accurate knowledge of eighteenth-century texts only to the extent that
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we avoid contaminating the object imder investigation with our own
beliefs, prejudices, or interests."
Many articles in 16J0-lS^0<iisplzy this confidence that careful and
patient critics, who resist the lure of theoretical distractions, can (and
should) discover the intention an author deposited in his or her text. In
an essay on Moll Flanders's repentance, Michael F. Suarez shows that
"Defoe plants a number of instructive inferences in his preface" (3:15),
inferences that, Suarez implies, careful readers shotild be able to recover.
"Once it becomes clear that Defoe was most probably aware of the
incompleteness of his heroine's repentance, and that he had a conscious
desire to instruct his audience, then it logically follows that we are
meant to recognize the moral impoverishment of Moll's consciousness"
(3:26). Another article expresses hope that the interpretation offered
"accurately reflects the artist's...intention" (8:134). This trust that
careful and observant critics can recover the meaning that an author has
deposited in a text also organizes Diana Patterson's "Foliation Jokes in
Tristram Shandy" (6:163-83). Testifying that she is "of the belief that
Steme never stopped designing his books page by page," Patterson asks
readers to "assume, at least initially, that [the jokes made by the pages
of the text] were intentional" (6:164-65):
Sterne tried as much as possible to lay out not only the story,
but the pages for us, and we miss a sizeable number of jokes
without the page, as Sterne thought of it, before us....While
not every example in this article is one I would wish to defend
in court as Sterne's, certainly some must have been. And such
a physical intervention by the author puts limits on our
modem notions that the author relinquishes the text once it
leaves the pen, or that the authors are more acts of fiction
than are their works. (6:183),
Offering what resemblesan "intelligent design" argument—the presence
of these complex "foliation jokes" proves the author's earlier "physical
intervention[s]"—Patterson sets the reader the task of dutifully tracking
these interventions by the ghostly author. These essays, it is important

" I discuss this language of making vs. finding, based on Nekon Goodman's Ways cf
Worldmaking (Hacketi, 1978), in The Practice of Quixotism (Palgrave, forthcoming).
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to note, are self-reflexive about their critical practice, defending
"intentionalism" rather than jixst enacting it. Suarez, for instance,
critiques the"New Critical 'intentional fallacy'" in a footnote that cites
another theorist who provides "philosophical grounding" for
intentionalism (3:26n42).
But, as we have seen above. Enlightenment Objectivity by no
means constitutes a party line for 1650-1850. Indeed, the journal's
articles frequently display something quite different, what we might call
an "Enlightened Postmodernism" that takes varied forms: challenging
whether critics can ever "see" without the mediation of cultural
discourses of which they may be unaware, insisting that postmodern
theorists are useful in imderstanding early modern texts, arguing that
early modern writers adopt intellectual positions that closely resemble
postmodern ones. For instance, Anna Battigelli explores the "subjectiv
ity in which our inquiry of the world is inevitably trapped" (2:30, 38),
a familiar topic in postmodern discourse, by finding it in Margaret
Cavendish's Blazing World (1666); Todd Parker locates an equally
postmodern position in Swift's "Description of a City Shower" (1710),
which, he argues, exposes that "meaning is contingent upon the
categories into which reality may be translated": Swift "transform[s] his
subject matter from an innocent object of perception into a value-laden
object of interpretation" (4:294, 304). Other articles treat Blake as
"uncannily postmodern" (2:65), celebrate Georg Christoph Lichtenberg
as a "poststructuralist critic avantla lettre" (2:226), or, with Baudrillard's
help, explore Defoe's "animus toward representations...that represent
nothing, simulacra that dissipate meaning" (3:191). Such contentions
would undoubtedly run afoul of critics committed to Enlightenment
Objectivity, who would consider them making what they claim to find.
But many of the articles in 1650-1850 show, as one reviewer put it, that
"the theoretical questions posed by late twentieth-century criticism are
not necessarily incompatible with a broadly sympathetic readings of
texts, even those from the seventeenth century" (3:365-66).
In 1650-1850,then, one regularly encounters a variety of theoreti
cal positions: that recent criticism has careened wildly out of control,
repeatedly committing errors of projection; that eighteenth-century
writers adopt positions that seem "uncannily postmodern"; even that
more traditional criticism, in claiming only to find the meaning
deposited by authors, mistakenly recognizes its own products as those
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of the eighteenth-century author. Nowhere is this variety more evident
than in the accounts of "William Hogarth that have appeared in
1650-1850. One of the strongest voicesfor Enhghtened Postmodernism
has been Peter Wagner, who, in several pieces for 1650-1850, explores
Hogarth studies in order to critique a foundation of Enlightenment
Objectivity: critics' confidence they can recover an author's "intention."
For Wagner, Ronald Paulson's writings embody an "intentionalism"
that continues to "fetter" the way we read early modem texts, even
though "since the 1960s, authorial (or declared) intention has been
considered relatively unimportant in the analysis of literary texts"
(2:234). Paulson "relies on the belief" that "it is possible to retrieve
authorial/artistic intention ('Hogarth's point' is his favorite expression
in this context)," that "this intention structures and dominates the
graphic works" (2:231), and that Hogarth is "in control of any kind of
verbal or visual discourse" (3:403). Most crucially for my discussion
here, Wagner (with Nietzsche's help) accuses Paulson of mistaking his
reading for Hogarth's intention: he "first hides meaning somewhere in
the bushes (that is, the work of art) and then triumphantly goes in
search of it" (3:401) and thus "sells us a critic's sophisticated view as
authorial intention" (3:402). Moreover, while Paulson "sell[s] us the
critic's opinion as authorial intention" (3:403), obscuring his own role
in constming Hogarth, Wagner embraces his complicity as a critic in
making what he seems to find in the text. It is "critical discourse,"
Wagner argues, "that necessarily (re)creates artists and their intentions"
(3:403)." But if here Wagner marshals an Enlightened Postmodernist's
charge against intentionalism in Hogarth studies, other articles on
Hogarth in 1650-1850 enact the very intentionalism characteristic of
Enhghtenment Objectivity that Wagner attacks. BerndKrysmanski, for
instance, argues that Hogarth "hid" references to the Passion in his
Rake's Progress for careful and informed readers to "discover" and thus
recognize the series as an "anti-Passion" (4:139). While one paragraph
admits that "we caxmot with certainty maintain that Hogarth really had
all these allusions in mind when he executed his plates" (4:144), the essay
assumes that discovering Hogarth's intentions is the critic's job. In

" And yet Wagner's claim that "as soon as we turn away from the author...we will hear what
the text has to say itself" (2:234) implies that critics should remove themselves entirely so they
can listen, as objectively as possible, to "what the text has to say itself."
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practice, Krysmanski's essay proceeds by speculating on what "Hogarth
may have had in mind" (4:170) or identifying when "we can be quite
sure" about what Hogarth had "in his mind" (4:179); the repetition of
phrases such as "it is obviously no coincidence" (4:155) or "it cannot be
a matter of chance" (4:177-78) further insist that Hogarth laid the
pattern that Krysmanski describes. Krysmanski believes, above all, that
he is finding the "hidden meaning" (4:139) that Hogarth deliberately
lodged in the plates of the Rake's Progress.
These discussions between Enlightenment Objectivists and
Enlightened Postmodernists over whether critics find or make the texts
they analyze can be seen, as well, in the special feature (9:269-362) that
gathers essays to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Eaves and
Kimpel's Samuel Richardson: A Biography (1971). Here Eaves and
Kimpel embody Enlightenment Objectivism, confident in the possibil
ity of discovering Richardson's intentions through careful reading
unfettered by the sort of "ingenious interpretations" (largely provoked
by Freud) that had begun to distort hterary study in "our day": "We see
no harm," they wrote, "in taking the trouble to find out what an author
thought he was doing."" Eaves and Kimpel "believ[ed] (as their subject
did) in conscious art," Murray Brown notes, and so they dismiss any
"interpretation" that "would necessarily, and they believe unfairly, or
unproductively, impose upon Richardson's life critical paradigms that,
obviously, could not be known" to him (9:328). But the articles in
1650-1850 reposition Eaves and Kimpel as making the Richardson they
claim just to find. Carol Houhhan Flynn notes that Eaves and Kimpel's
Richardson reads hke other biographies written in the 1960s and 1970s,
in which the subject "resembled their makers": "Swift sounds remark
ably like Irvin Ehrenpreis (who constructed whom, one wonders), while
Pope took on the ostensibly sweeter and less contentious qualities of
Maynard Mark. Johnson could be as neurotic as Walter Jackson Bate
or as workmanlike as Paul Fussell" (9:311). D. N. DeLuna's critique of
the editing of Yale University Press's Poemson Affairs of State (1963-75)
suggests, similarly, that critics have re-made "Pope and Swift" into
"eighteenth-century versions of themselves," indicting Frank Ellis, in

" T. C.Duncan Eaves and Ben D. Kimpel, Samuel Richardson: A Biography (Oxford; Clarendon
Press, 1971), 276,278. Both quotations appear in William H. Epstein, "Remembering the Past:
Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson and the Uses of Literary Biography,' 16S0-1SS0,9:290.
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particular, for "makfing] Defoe over into an etkical activist who
allegedly holds to a particular conception of man" (4:356n35,350). In
these accounts, although biographers (or critics) set out to depict their
subjects as they "really are"—objectively, accurately, without distor
tions—they end up re-making them into something else due to the
personal, professional, or ideological filters through which, unbe
knownst to themselves, they see and read. "Biographers inevitably
depict themselves, if with varying degrees of lucidity and self-aware
ness," Catherine N. Parke remarks, "in the lives they write" (9:346).
Ellis's Defoe, Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson, Paulson's Hogarth, Bate's
Johnson or Fussell's Johnson—these figures are necessary substitutes for
(and frequently mistaken for) a "real" Defoe or Richardson or Hogarth
or Johnson that, these Enlightened Postmodernist accounts imply, is
unrecoverable and thus imrepresentable.
My own sympathies in the contest between Enlightenment
Objectivity and Enlightened Postmodernism are likely evident: I suspect
that we re-make texts, largely unknowingly, into what we would like
them to be. But I describe these competing positions here only to note
that 1650-1850 leiusts to arbitrate in the critical controversies that have,
for the past decade, divided our profession. Its willingness to print
articles that not only offer competing interpretations but also display
radically different methodologies may seem to some to mark editorial
inconsistency; but this willingness is better construed as a "new
eclecticism" (7:xv) or, perhaps, as what seventeenth-century clerics called
a "latitude." 1650-1850 evinces the temperament described in Melvyn
New's essay on latitudinarianism: modest, anti-systematic, a "readiness
to live with...differences of opinion" (4:98). New shows that Benjamin
Whichcote's aphorisms offer "careful but...ultimately undecidable
reasoning on...vexed eighteenth-century question[s]" (4:103), and
1650-1850h.3s offered an identical service. In an early Editor's Forward,
Kevin Cope described the journal's anti-systematicity: "Perhaps the
most promising surprise of our own critical era is that a decade of socialand economic-historical commentary has happily failed to reduce all the
myriad irregularities of early modernity to smoothly 'scientific' or
'political' interpretations." Instead, Cope continues, it has "draw[n]
attention to the intensity, variety, immediacy, irreducibility, and
inexhaustibility of beliefs of all sorts." This "unexpected outcome of
postmodern criticism," Cope adds, is a "fortunate fall" (2:xiv). In her
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discussion of Eaves and
Richardson, Parke notes that "for most
postmodern or post-postmodern readers, at least those in the academy,
scarcely any issues...are more vexed, when treated seriously, or more
condescended to, when treated dismissively, than" the "psychoanalytic
and culturally-historically based theories of criticism" that Eaves and
Kimpel dismiss or the notions of "free will, identity, agency, and hence
individual achievement" they embrace (9:347). Parke is right, of course,
about the heat generated by these issues; yet 1650-1850h.2LS provided an
institutional forum for all parties in these "vexed" wars to speak and be
heard.
It is difficult to think of another journal that displays such
"latitude": most possess (if they rarely state explicitly) a party-line,
evident in the theoretical engagements (or lack thereof) of the articles
they publish. It is difficult to think of another journal that would print,
as 1650-1850 has, articles that practice such different modes of scholar
ship: history of ideas ([. T. Scanlan, "Johnson and Pufendorf," 8:27-59),
Lacanian readings (Mark S. Lussier, "Eternal Dictates: The 'Other' of
Blakean Inspiration," 2:61-74), exhaustive assemblages of quotations
(George Rousseau, "Towards a Geriatric Enlightenment," 6:3-43),
editorial reports (A. C. Elias, Jr., "Editing Minor Writers: The Case of
Laetitia Pilkington and Mary Barber," 3:129-47), attribution studies
0ames Buickerood, "Two Dissertations Concerning Sense, and the
Imagination. With an Essay on Consciousness [1728]: A Study in
Attribution," 7:51-86), spare chronicles of overlooked church history
(Fr. John Panagiotou, "Greek Orthodoxy in the Eighteenth Century:
A Probe," 5:263-73). I suspect no journal, moreover, has contributors
from such varied locations: from colleges and universities of all sizes and
types (including many in non-Anglophone countries), from other sorts
of institutions altogether (Old Sturbridge Village, History of Parliament
Trust, St. Spyridon's Church), from independent scholars. That these
radically different modes of scholarship, which issue from radically
different scholarly "situations," easily co-exist in the pages of 1650-1850
testifies to the journal's success at realizing what James Noggle describes
as the "promise" offered by the "public sphere" theorized by Jiirgen
Habermas "of universal access to...debate" (10:360).
1650-1850's "latitude" exposes the critical practices that often so
dominate our vision that they seem to represent all the work in the field
to be merely islands—some, it is true, quite extensive—that havesurfaced
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amidst a vast sea of other sorts of scholarly work. Such islands gain
stability, as it were, from the series that university presses periodically
establish, which encourage the continued production of scholarly work
on particular topics or that deploy particular methodologies; many
journals, too, help reinforce such practices and, perhaps, lead us to
misrecognizing such trends as the whole, Reading Eighteenth-Century
Studies, Eighteenth-Century; Theory and Interpretation, or EighteenthCentury Fiction, it would be easy to imagine that the entire field has
embraced a cultural studies approach that (a) placesliterary texts in their
cultural context and (b) uses recent theory to illuminate eighteenthcentury texts and eighteenth-century texts to explore the claims of
recent theory, 1650-1850 regularly publishes work of this sort, of
course, but in refusing to limit itself to such work it has ensured that
scholars of the long eighteenth century recognize not just these islands
but the vast and diverse sea that surrounds them.

